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INTRODUCTION
“[T]he power to tax involves the power to destroy,”1 and from this fact it follows that giving
“states the power to tax the church would be tantamount to giving it the power to destroy the
church.”2 Throughout history, religious institutions have been tax exempt by means of common
law3 or statutory provisions.4 Tax exemptions have been customary in society since the ancient
world.5 “Egypt, Sumeria, Babylon and Persia forgave priests and temples their taxes.” 6 Despite
the long tradition of tax exemptions, most scholars have been unable to pinpoint when government
tax exemptions for religious institutions became normalized. 7 Nevertheless, modern reliance on
tax exemptions for religious institutions are widespread today and derive from some combination
of historical precedent, legislative determination, constitutional law, and judicial interpretation.
The First Amendment contains two clauses that create a spectrum where the government
balances the interest of the State and the interest of religious institutions.

Through the

Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause (“the Religion Clauses”), the federal
government adheres to a basic principle of neutrality towards religion. The Religion Clauses
achieve this result by ensuring, via the Establishment Clause, that no particular religion is
established or preferred over others, while also ensuring, via the Free Exercise Clause, that every
religion is practiced without discrimination or interference. In Gitlow v. New York,8 the Supreme
Court held that the protections of the First Amendment extend to the actions of state and local
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governments through the Fourteenth Amendment, thus, in effect, applying this same principle of
religious neutrality to all actors at all different levels of government.
Utilizing the language from the Religion Clauses, the Supreme Court has decided two
monumental cases concerning the taxation of religious institutions and the “entanglement”
concerns to which that practice often gives rise. In 1970, the Supreme Court, in Walz v. Tax
Commission of New York,9 held that state grants of tax exemptions to religious institutions do not
violate the Establishment Clause, 10 emphasizing that “[e]ach value judgment under the Religion
Clauses must turn on whether particular acts in question are intended to establish or interfere with
religious beliefs and practices or have the effect of doing so.” 11 Shortly after Walz, the Court
reviewed Lemon v. Kurtzman12, a case regarding government funding of religious primary and
secondary schools, and expressed that “[t]he objective is to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion
of either [state or religion] into the precincts of the other.” 13

The Court emphasized that

“prophylactic”14 interactions between state and churches “will involve excessive and enduring
entanglement between” both institutions.15
Since Walz and Lemon, state and local governments have attempted to navigate the delicate
parameters outlined by the Court’s interpretation of the Religion Clauses. This essay will identify
various instances in which state and local governments, facilitated by their own courts, have erred
too far to the side of intruding upon the operation of religious institutions, thus resulting in an
infringement of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. This essay will exam the history of tax
exemptions for religious institutions, the Court’s application of the First Amendment’s Religion
Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
Id. at 680.
11
Id. at 669.
12
Lemon v. Kurtman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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Id. at 614.
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Id. at 619.
15
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Clauses, the Court’s analysis in Walz and Lemon, and modern tax exemptions on religious
institutions.
I.

THE HISTORY OF TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
A. Tax Exemptions in the Ancient World
Religious tax exemptions “extend as far into the past as do written records….” 16 The

widespread competition in the ancient world for actual authority between government and
religious institutions created a necessity for religious tax exemptions. 17 In the ancient world, the
decision not to tax was largely a decision not to antagonize.”18 The contention between established
empires and the prominent religious bodies based in those societies led to societal economic
collapses, the confiscation of wealth from churches, and a desire to destroy through taxation. 19
America’s commitment to a separation of church and state derives in part from historical records
that indicate that separation protects and preserves religious liberties and the political arena. 20
B. Tax Exemptions in America
In the United States property tax was a “tax on all forms of property, real and personal,
tangible and intangible, ‘upon every man according to his estate, and with consideration to all his
other abilities . . . .’”21 Modern property tax in the “United States is limited largely to real estate,
reaching only selected items of personal property.”22 State and local government reliance on
property tax revenues varies. In recent years, “property taxes accounted for nearly seventy-five
percent of all local government taxes and thirty-six percent of all state and local taxes combined.”23
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Almost all of state and local taxes are derived from property taxes. 24 Property taxes also supply
“most school districts’ independent revenue.”25

Nonetheless, many states allow broad tax

exemptions because “[e]xemption of personal property simplifies tax administrations . . . .”26
Congress, from the beginning of the Nation’s founding, has understood the Religion
Clauses to authorize tax exemptions for religious institutions. 27 In 1802, after the ratification of
the Constitution, Congress enacted a taxing statute which provided tax exemptions for churches. 28
As a result, an inference may be made that early government participants were aware of the
existence and implementation of tax exemptions for religious institutions and still, no language
was developed to undermine its existence. 29 Justice Brennan, in his Walz concurrence, expressed
that existing evidence of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison’s knowledge of religious tax
exemptions make it unlikely that they would have “remained silent had they thought the
exemptions established religion.”30
America’s current laws regarding tax exemptions of religious property stem from two
traditions: “(1) a common law tradition, which accorded such exemptions to established churches
that discharged certain governmental burdens; and (2) an equity law tradition, which accorded
such exemptions to all churches that dispensed certain social benefits.”31 Those traditions
contributed to the development of state laws (often initially in the form of colonial laws) that
exempted religious institutions from taxation. 32
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Id. at 868.
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a. Common Law Tradition
In the colonies, the common law traditions did not automatically provide unrestricted tax
exemptions to religious institutions. 33 All property within a particular jurisdiction was taxable at
common law unless exempted by a particular legislative act. 34 Only certain types of religious
institutions were considered exemptible. 35

These included the “properties of incorporated

established churches that were devoted to the appropriate ‘religious uses’ prescribed by
ecclesiastical law, such as chapels, parsonages, glebes, and consecrated cemeteries.”36 “The
exclusivity of established churches in the 17th and 18th centuries was often carried to prohibition
of other forms of worship.”37 Generally, churches were often responsible for “quit-rent taxes, poll
taxes, land taxes” and other similar property taxes. 38 The exclusivity of established churches
diminished exemptions applicable to all types of religious properties throughout the colonies. 39
Oftentimes these exemptions could be lifted in “times of emergency or abandoned
altogether if the tax liability imposed on remaining properties in the community proved too
onerous.”40

However, these tax exemptions, were a product of a religious institutions’

establishment within a particular colony. 41

These established religious institutions were

effectively arms of the state or “state agencies, and their clergy were effectively state officials.” 42
Consequently, those religious institutions who were privileged enough to receive tax exemptions
were de facto government agencies. 43
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Id. at 371.
Id.
35
Id. at 372.
36
Id.
37
Walz, 397 U.S. at 668.
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Witte, Jr., supra note 2, at 373.
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Id. at 374.
40
Id.
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Id. at 374.
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Id. at 374-75.
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Id. at 375.
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b. Equity Tradition
Tax exemptions at equity were applied by colonial chancery courts with a different
reasoning than those applied by common law. 44 Equity courts exempted religious institutions
because of their contributions to charitable efforts. 45 These exemptions were only granted to
religious institutions that engaged in charity.46 The courts viewed the activity itself to determine
the charitable character. 47 Religious institutions were also utilized to “host town assemblies,
political rallies, and public auctions, to hold educational and vocational classes, to maintain census
rolls and marriage certificates, to house the community library, and to discharge a number of other
public functions.”48 Additionally, the “[p]arsonages were used not only to house the minister’s
family but also to harbor orphans and widows, the sick and the handicapped, and victims of abuse
and disaster.”49
In recognition of this work, equity courts would provide tax exemptions and subsidies. 50
Both the amount of the subsidy and the scope of the exemption was calculated on a case-by-case
basis.51 Certain individuals designated and regulated by the equity courts would visit the religious
institution to conduct a performance assessment and determine its needs. 52 After their visit, they
would recommend “to the equity court each charity’s entitlement to subsidy and exemption.”53
The equity courts would then provide the religious institutions “with a second basis for receiving
tax exemptions for their properties and tax subsidies for their activities.” 54
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Id. at 375.
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Id. at 376.
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Id. at 378.
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Id.
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Id. at 378.
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c. Disruption in the Colonial Patterns of Religious Tax Exemptions
Colonial laws surrounding the “tax exemption of church property continued largely
uninterrupted in the early decades of the American republic.” 55 However, at a particular point
three different developments disrupted the “colonial pattern of tax exemption of church
property.”56 First, the disestablishment of religion within states began to prohibit religious
establishment within state constitutions. 57 Churches that may have previously belonged to a state
or local government were no longer a subsidized state agency and thus, were no longer in
possession of what was considered tax-exempt government property. 58 The second, was the
revocation of English statutes through state constitutional mandates. 59 The English Statute of
Charitable Uses of 1601 was one of the casualties of the revocation of traditional equity law. 60 As
a result, charitable institutions and in turn religious institutions, were no longer under the
jurisdiction of equity courts.61 This separation eventually led to the demise of equity rationale for
tax exemptions.62 Third, the presumption that all property was to incur property taxes provided an
additional burden on the implementation of tax exemptions for religious institutions. 63 The
impression that exemptions could only be granted if it consisted of bringing forth “public welfare”
or advancing other “good and compelling reasons” dismantled the presumption of providing tax
exemptions for religious institutions. 64
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Id. at 380.
Id.
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Id. at 383.
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Id. at 384.
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II.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT, WALZ AND LEMON
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”65 The Religion Clauses
reflect the framers’ initial desire to avoid government entanglement with religion.

The

Establishment Clause prevents the government from establishing a preferred religion and avoids
potentially discriminatory laws towards different or opposing religious groups. The Free Exercise
Clause proceeds on the notion that people should rarely be forced to do things that oppose their
religious beliefs and the government should not be allowed to override religious beliefs without a
legitimate reason.
A. Walz
The Supreme Court directly confronted the relationship between religious-based tax
exemptions and the Religion Clauses in Walz, where a property-owner sought an injunction to
prevent the New York City Tax Commission from granting tax exemptions to religious
organizations using otherwise-taxable property for religious worship. 66 The exemption was
authorized by New York’s state constitution, 67 but the claimant in Walz contended that the
exemption, in effect, amounted to express government support to religious bodies in violation of
the U.S. Constitution’s Establishment Clause.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger noted that a complete separation of
government from religion was not viable. 68 Indeed, as the Court went on to explain, the “very
existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts – one that seeks to mark boundaries

65

U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.
Walz, 397 U.S. at 666.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 676.
66
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to avoid excessive entanglement.”69 Chief Justice Burger presented fire and police protection
received by religious institutions that are afforded by state and local governments to demonstrate
the inevitable contact that exist between government and religion. 70 According to Chief Justice
Burger, reliance on these services does not diminish a genuine expectation of separation between
government and religion. 71 Chief Justice Burger turned to the issue at hand and similarly
determined that tax exemptions were not aimed at the establishment, sponsorship, or support of
religion. 72 In particular, Chief Justice Burger emphasized that “[n]othing in this national attitude
towards religious tolerance and two centuries of uninterrupted freedom from taxation has given
the remotest sign of leading to an established church or religion and on the contrary it has operated
affirmatively to help guarantee the free exercise of all forms of religious beliefs.” 73
Regarding the assessment of excessive government entanglement with religion, the Court
determined that religious tax exemptions create “only a minimal and remote involvement between
church and state.”74 The involvement is far less than the taxation of religious institutions.75
Therefore, the Court reasoned that tax exemptions were not in violation of the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment because “[n]o perfect or absolute separation is really possible.”76
The Court in Walz then identified parameters that allow tax exemptions to presume a
constitutional identity. Whereas it may be unconstitutional to grant tax exemptions to only some
religious groups, that was not the case in Walz and is generally not permissible. Tax exemptions
are not utilized for the “advancement or inhibition of religion.”

69

Id. at 670.
Walz, 397 U.S. at 676.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 675-76.
73
Id. at 678.
74
Id. at 676.
75
Id. at 674.
76
Id. at 670.
77
Walz, 397 U.S. at 672.
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77

Providing religious tax

exemption does not single out any particular church or religious group. 78 Tax exemptions are
granted to “all houses of religious worship . . . .”79 Neither are the qualifications for tax exemptions
intended to be “perpetual or immutable,” tax-exempt groups may lose their status if their activities
no longer satisfy the parameters defined by the legislature, while new religious institution may
develop and receive tax exempt status. 80 Tax exemptions simply guarantee a “reasonable and
balanced attempt to guard against th[e] dangers,” of exercising economic hostility towards religion
on behalf of the government.81
B. Lemon
In Lemon the Court reviewed a case with a particular focus on entanglement concerns
regarding statutes that granted aid to church-related elementary and secondary educational
facilities.82 Both of the statutes at issue were challenged as being in violation of the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 83 The
Court held that both statutes were unconstitutional. 84
The Court predicated its decision on the finding that the enacting legislatures had
recognized that “church-related elementary and secondary schools have a significant religious
mission and that a substantial portion of their activities is religiously oriented.” 85 Therefore, the
legislature would be obligated to create statutory restrictions to “guarantee the separation between
secular and religious educational functions and to ensure that state financial aid supports only the
former.”86 The Court ultimately reasoned that:
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Id. at 673.
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606.
83
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Id. at 625.
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Id. at 613.
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Id.
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All [the] provisions [utilized to create statutory restriction that guarantee separation
between secular and religious educational functions] are precautions taken in
candid recognition that these programs approached, even if they did not intrude
upon, the forbidden areas under the Religion Clauses. We need not decide whether
these legislative precautions restrict the principal or primary effect of the programs
to the point where they do not offend the Religion Clauses, for we conclude that
the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each
State involves excessive entanglement between government and religion. 87
Chief Justice Burger, writing once again for the majority, clarified that “under the statutory
exemption before [the Court] in Walz, the State had a continuing burden to ascertain that the
exempt property was in fact being used for religious worship.”88 The Court then identified, that
to “determine whether the government entanglement with religion is excessive, [courts] must
examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited” and should be cautious
of “‘programs whose very nature is apt to entangle the state in details of administration . . . .’” 89
After analyzing the statutes and assessing whether a secular legislative purpose existed, and
finding that it did; and analyzing whether the statutes’s principal or primary effect advanced or
inhibited religion, and deciding that secular and religious education is identifiable and separable; 90
the Court ultimately asserted that the very need to engage in surveillance in order to enforce the
statutes demonstrated sufficient entanglement to invalidate the statutes as unconstitutional. 91
Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, echoed this concern and asserted that the state’s power
to dictate what is or is not secular or religious, is sufficiently apt to “promote rancor and ill-will
between church and state” that would result from the surveillance the statute in Lemon required.92

87

Id. at 613-14.
Id. at 614.
89
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 695 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
90
Id. at 612-13.
91
Id. at 620.
92
Id. at 637 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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A connection exists between the entanglement depicted in Lemon and the entanglement
concerns that arise from state and local government practices of taxing portions of religious
institutions. Just as the statute in Lemon that required state actors to separate secular and religious
lessons was deemed unconstitutional entanglement, allowing the government to divide and
determine what portions of a religious institution counts as taxable also creates entanglement
concerns between state and church.
III.

MODERN TAX EXEMPTIONS
All fifty states now grant tax exemptions for property belonging to religious institutions.93

The language used within the particular constitutional section or statutory provision varies. 94
Some states use narrow language such as “religious worship” to maintain stringent control on tax
exemptions, while other states use less stringent language such as “religious purpose,” which
broadens interpretation.95 “Religious Worship” allows state and local governments to maintain
stringent control on tax exemptions because the government must determine if the activity taking
place on the property qualifies as exempt religious worship.96 The government does so by
considering the regular services, ceremonies, rituals, religious instructions, the exclusivity of the
group and other activities directed towards a higher being.97 “Religious purpose” on the other
hand is less restrictive and is defined in a broad manner that encompasses a general range of
activities.98 The varying language used within different state constitutions and statutes are

93

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 676.
Evelyn Brody, All Charities Are Property-Tax Exempt, but Some Charities Are More Exempt Than Others, 44
NEW ENG. L. REV. 621, 671-72 (2010).
95
4 WILLIAM W. BASSETT, W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & ROBERT T. SMITH, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW §
33:16 (2d ed. 2017).
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indicative of the various approaches states are taking when granting tax exemptions to religious
institutions.
As indicated in Walz, the determination as to whether a religious institution is in fact a
religious institution worthy of obtaining a tax exemption is an appropriate question outside of the
parameters of entanglement concerns.99 This is so because the Court determined that both taxing
religious institutions and exempting religious institutions gave rise to some degree of involvement
with religion.100 However, the Court found that the elimination of exemptions would “expand the
involvement of government by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax
foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal
processes.”101 The Court deemed that no genuine nexus existed between a tax exemption and the
establishment of religion.102 The Court went on to express that “[t]he exemption creates only a
minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less than taxation of churches.
It restricts the fiscal relationship between church and state, and tends to complement and reinforce
the desired separation insulating each from the other.”103
Although most states differ in determining whether the property must be used for religious
worship or purpose, the language within state constitutions and state statutes are relatively concise
and generally read as follow: “all property used exclusively for religious … purposes … shall be
exempt from taxation . . . .”104 The concise language utilize by state legislators provides room for
interpretation. However, if a state is to utilized Chief Justice Burger’s assertion in Lemon as to
“the character and purposes” of a religious institution to determine deference for tax exemptions,
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it must do so broadly.105 As indicated in Walz, religious institutions get broad protections under
the Religion Clauses to avoid state-religion interactions that would harm either the state or
religion.106 Nevertheless, states still tax portions of religious institutions that they deem separate
from the religious worship or purpose. However, once a religious institution has been deemed
worthy of a tax exemption, no standard exists to avoid or define what portions of that religious
institution’s property may count as being utilized for sufficient religious worship or purpose.
In an effort to tax religious institutions, state and local governments have developed
different tests or standards to identify when portions of a religious institution are taxable. State
statutes and courts have applied standards such as the reasonably necessary standard,107 which
assesses how necessary a particular portion of a religious property is to the objective of the
religious institution; the exclusive use standard,108 which assesses if the property’s sole use is
religious in nature; and the dominant purpose test,109 which determines if the primary use of the
property is religious in nature. These standards or test create an entanglement between state and
church through the required surveillance necessary to utilize them. An examination of a religious
property dispute through any of the standards requires courts to infringe on the Religion Clauses.
A. Reasonably Necessary Standard
The reasonably necessary standard considers whether a parsonage is reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the religious institution’s objectives. 110 In German Apostolic Christian
Church v. Department of Revenue,111 the Oregon Supreme Court reviewed a decision from the tax
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Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
Walz, 397 U.S. at 673
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German Apostolic Christian Church v. Dep't of Revenue, 569 P.2d 596, 599 (Or. 1977).
108
Christ Church Pentecostal v. Tenn. State Bd. of Equalization, 428 S.W.3d 800, 807 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013).
109
Shrine of Our Lady of La Salette Inc. v. Bd. of Assessors of Attleboro, 71 N.E.3d 509, 517 (Mass. 2017).
110
German Apostolic Christian Church, 569 P.2d at 599.
111
569 P.2d 596 (Or. 1977).
106

14

court regarding the language in an Oregon statute 112 that allowed the exemption of only portions
of an ad volerem property tax on religious institutions.113 The text of the relevant statute allows
an exemption for religious institutions that primarily use the property for the goals of the religious
institution.114 If a religious institution were to claim tax exemption for a portion of its property
used for charitable purposes, the exemption requires that the charitable use is in the “advancement
of religion and must be primarily115 for the benefit of the institution as well as reasonably
necessary for the furthering of the religious aims of the” religious institution. 116
The issue in German Apostolic Christian Church arose after the construction of a new
building on its property using donations, and monetary/manual labor gifts.117 When the project
was completed it was used for several purposes, including housing for the Administrating Elder of
the congregation, a guest area with three bedrooms, and six apartments for elderly members of the
church.118 After its completion the County Assessor determined that the property was subject to
assessment for the following tax year. 119

112

307.140 Property of religious organizations.
Upon compliance with ORS 307.162, the following property owned or being purchased by religious organizations
shall be exempt from taxation:
(1) All houses of public worship and other additional buildings and property used solely for administration,
education, literary, benevolent, charitable, entertainment and recreational purposes by religious
organizations, the lots on which they are situated, and the pews, slips and furniture therein. However, any
part of any house of public worship or other additional buildings or property which is kept or used as a
store or shop or for any purpose other than those stated in this section shall be assessed and taxed the same
as other taxable property.
(2) Parking lots used for parking or any other use as long as that parking or other use is permitted without
charge for no fewer than 355 days during the tax year.
(3) Land and the buildings thereon held or used solely for cemetery or crematory purposes, including any
buildings solely used to store machinery or equipment used exclusively for maintenance of such lands.
113
German Apostolic Christian Church, 569 P.2d at 597.
114
Id. at 599.
115
This essay addresses the dominant use standard in a separate section.
116
German Apostolic Christian Church, 569 P.2d at 599.
117
Id. at 597.
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Id. at 597-98.
119
Id. at 598.
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At the conclusion of an evidentiary trial, the Tax Court found the first floor office, a
basement meeting area, and a vault to be exempt from taxation. 120 The remainder of the building
however, was taxable.”121 The Supreme Court of Oregon reviewed the assessment and determined
that through the statutory language “the Tax Court was correct in allowing an exemption for the
office room in the Administrating Elder’s residence but disallowing further exemption.” 122 The
court asserted that it received insufficient evidence “as to the necessity of a parsonage including
the specific duties of [the Administrating Elder living on the property] which require his
continuous presence near the house of worship of the church.” 123
When determining whether the guest area for visiting church officials was entitled to tax
exemptions, the court reviewed the language within the statute. 124 Although the amount of times
the property was used was not a factor in and of itself, it was indicative of the reliance on the guest
area or lack thereof.125 The court expressed that “[i]nfrequent use of the property may indicate in
part that such utilization is not reasonably necessary for the advancement of church aims,” 126 and
the church presented “insufficient evidence of the necessity for [the] area.” 127 The court also found
“that the portion of the property used as a guest area for visiting church officials was not entitled
to an exemption . . . .”128 The court held that the charitable and nonreligious use of the portion of
the property that provided low-rent apartments to the needy and older members of the church’s
congregation was tax exempted because of the charitable purpose.129

120

Id.
Id.
122
German Apostolic Christian Church, 569 P.2d at 600.
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Id.
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Id.
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126
Id.
127
Id.
128
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The reasonably necessary standard in German Apostolic Christian Church, allowed the
court to consider whether a portion of the church’s property was reasonably necessary for its
religious mission. Like the unconstitutional surveillance necessary in Lemon to determine which
classes were secular or religious, the surveillance necessary here to determine whether a portion
of a property belonging to a religious institution is reasonably necessary, allows the court to first
determine what it believes to be reasonably necessary and then requires monitoring by secular
authorities to ensure that religious groups follow those standards. That in and of itself is
detrimental to the wall between state and church.
The court in German Apostolic Christian Church made clear that convincing evidence
was necessary to demonstrate the requisite nexus to the organization’s religious mission.
However, the court does not provide what may satisfy such a standard. Essentially, the court is
creating in itself unfettered power that may continuously change with individual bias. What is
reasonable to one judge may not be reasonable to the next and what is reasonable in one religion
may not be reasonable in the next. The individuality and uniqueness associated with different
religious beliefs cannot be restricted by a subjective reasonable standard. Simply put, if a court
invites individual judges to define what is reasonable it creates an unconstitutional standard that
supports the entanglement of state and church.
B. Exclusive Use Standard
The exclusive use standard assesses whether the property’s sole use is religious in nature. 130
This assessment in and of itself presents an entanglement concern between state and religion. For
example, in a recent and controversial decision, a Tennessee court deemed portions of a “megachurch” taxable. In Christ Church Pentecostal v. Tennessee State Board of Equalization,131 Christ

130
131

Christ Church Pentecostal, 428 S.W.3d at 807.
428 S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013).
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Church Pentecostal (“CCP”), completed construction of a multi-million dollar building known as
the Hardwick Family Life Center (“the Center”). 132 The Center contained “space for worship and
fellowship; classrooms; offices; an indoor playground, the ‘For His Glory’ bookstore/café area;
and the Hardwick Activity Center (“HAC”), which includes a fitness center and gymnasium.” 133
After a site visit in 2007, a staff attorney for the State Board of Equalization determined that most
of the new building was tax-exempt.134 However, the staff attorney denied the exemption for
portions of the building containing the bookstore/café area and the fitness center/gymnasium on
the grounds that they were retail/commercial in nature and not used for religious purposes.135 CCP
appealed and the matter was heard by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). 136 In 2009 the judge
affirmed the denial of the exemption for the bookstore/café and “granted a fifty percent exemption
for the fitness center area on the basis that it was used for CCP’s youth recreational activities in
addition to general public use on a membership fee basis.”137
CCP filed a petition with the chancery court, asserting that the evidence submitted to the
ALJ and the Commission demonstrated that the bookstore/café and fitness centers were integral to
one or more of the church’s religious purposes.138 CCP claimed that the Commission’s decision
violated Tennessee’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Establishment Clause, insofar as
it turned on an official determination as to the religious purposes of CCP.139 The chancery court
affirmed the decision and CCP filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals of
Tennessee.140
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Christ Church Pentecostal, 428 S.W.3d at 804.
Id. at 804-05.
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Id. at 805.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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CCP claims that a violation of the Religion Clauses was at issue, the court however,
asserted that the state’s constitution deems all property taxable unless it is “duly exempted.”141
The court explained that it is undisputed that CCP is a religious institution and a majority of its
property is exempt from taxation, however, a portion of CCP’s property is not used for exempt
purposes.142 The court held that although the areas in question may have been in place to attract
new members, exemptions were not intend to apply to such uses.143 Under this premise, the court
determined that the “exclusive use” standard applied to the “direct and immediate use of the
property itself and to any indirect and consequential benefit to be derived from its use.” 144 “The
requirement is met when ‘the use is “directly incidental to or an integral part of” one of the
recognized purposes of an exempt institution.’” 145 The court reasoned that the bookstore/café and
the fitness center areas were not purely and exclusively for religious purposes.146
CCP asserted that the determination by the Commission and the trial court “excessively
entangles the government with church doctrine and theology and substitutes the wisdom of the
state for the doctrine of the church in contravention of the Establishment Clause.”147 The court
disagreed and determined that “although laws may not interfere with religious belief, they may
interfere with conduct that is religiously motivated.”148

CCP asserted, however, that “the

determination that it did not use the disputed areas of the Family Life Center exclusively for the
purpose for which CCP exists as a religious institution impermissibly entangle the State in matters
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of church doctrine by defining a ‘religious use.’” 149 CCP relied on a Colorado case which claims
that “avoiding a narrow construction of property tax exemptions based upon religious use also
serves the important purpose of avoiding any detailed governmental inquiry into or resultant
endorsement of religion that would be prohibited by the establishment clause of the first
amendment to the United States Constitution.”150 The court rejected the contention because it was
“predicated on the character of the taxpayer and on the manner in which the taxpayer used the
property.”151
CCP introduced more case law in support of its First Amendment claim relying on a New
York case where the court observed that “[i]n the tax context, the first amendment requires the
court to accept the entity’s characterization of its activities and beliefs as religious as long as the
characterization is in good faith.”152 The court dismissed that observation as well, claiming that
the “imposition of property tax on church property that is, by character and manner of use,
essentially commercial in nature does not interfere with CCP’s doctrine, beliefs, faith, or
government.”153 The court ultimately held that “‘[r]eligious institutions are not above the law . . .
.’” Therefore, a “State may, ‘enact and enforce facially neutral and uniformly applicable laws that
have the incidental effect of burdening a religious practice.”154 The court’s assertion that a state
may incidentally burden religious practices is questionable because the Court in Walz expressed
that to assess the entanglement concerns of a particular act one must look beyond the language of
the statute and to the effect it has on religious practices.155
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Nevertheless, the court in Christ Church Pentecostal, relied on the “exclusive use”
standard, to determine that the property in question was not directly incidental to the religious
purposes of the church. However, in utilizing such a standard, the court implicated the very
entanglement problems that the Supreme Court cautioned against in Lemon. The Court in Christ
Church Pentecostal could not have known whether or not CCP was utilizing the property solely
for religious use unless it reviewed and refused all arguments brought forth by CCP. This is
especially relevant because CCP’s argument for constructing the entire center was “to reach out to
the community and minister to their needs; something that is a direct purpose of the Church.” 156
The court rejected CPP’s claim and instead determined that CPP’s use of the area was far from
traditional,157 specifically the court pointed towards the Center’s paid staff and the gym’s feebased membership.158 However, the court failed to assess the value of the underlying purpose for
the Center: CPP’s religious mission.
In Lemon, the Court recognized that “a dedicated religious person, teaching in a school
affiliated with his or her faith operated to inculcate its tenents, will inevitably experience great
difficulty in remaining religiously neutral.” 159

That is exactly the case in Christ Church

Pentecostal, regardless of the initial commercial nature of portions of the property, according to
CCP, the entire premise is consumed with the religious intent to accumulate new church attendees
and to strengthen their religious mission. 160 CCP provided its religious understanding as to why
the property was relevant to their institution. If that reasoning is insufficient to satisfy the court’s
analysis of the property for taxation purpose, what would be? A bench is simply a bench before
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it is placed in a church and deemed a pew. Similarly, CCP may have built commercial properties,
but the commercial properties are utilized for CCP’s mission thus, altering the properties’ purpose.
If CCP’s sole intent was motivated by the continual growth of their congregation and religious
mission, the religious purpose should be clear. Demanding that a religious institution’s property
be used exclusively for outright religious purposes as allowed by a court of law drains the
community of a source that may provide more than a weekly religious service. Many religious
institutions utilize common areas for several things outside of the confines of exclusive religious
use. These uses include weddings, birthday parties, and other similar communal gatherings. Courts
should not be able to tax communal portions of religious institutions simply because it is not used
exclusively for a religious purpose. Doing so would force courts to make doctrinal determinations
as to the religious purposes of different parcels belonging to religious institutions.
C. Dominant Purpose Test
The dominant purpose test considers, each portion of church property, and determines
“whether its dominant purpose is religious worship or instruction, or connected with religious
worship or instruction (and is therefore exempt from taxation), or whether its dominant purpose is
something other than religious worship or instruction (and therefore has been ‘appropriated for
purposes other than religious worship or instruction’).”161 In Shrine of Our Lady of La Salette Inc.
v. Board of Assessors of Attleboro,162 for example, the Shrine, a “Catholic religious organization
affiliated with the Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette,” opened a national shrine in Attleboro,
Massachusetts in 1953, 163 which thousands of people visit each year. 164 In 2012 the city assessor’s
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determined that the Shrine owed property taxes based on the valuation of the property. 165 The
Shrine paid its property taxes with interest and filed an abatement the following year. 166 The city’s
board of assessors denied it.167 The assessors’ valuation divided the Shrine’s property into eight
distinct portions.168 Of the eight, the board determined that the welcome center, the maintenance
building, the safe house, and the wildlife sanctuary were fully taxable. 169
The court in Shrine of Our Lady of La Salette Inc., rejected “Shrine’s argument that the
dominant purpose test is an ‘all or nothing’ test regarding the exemption of church property, i.e.,
that an assessor must look at the entirety of a church’s property and determine whether the
dominant purpose of that property is religious worship or instruction, such that the entirety of the
property is either exempt or not.”170 Instead, the court found that the clause that grants the tax
exemptions for religious institutions also limits it. 171 The corresponding clause provides “that the
exemption shall not ‘extend to any portion of any such house of religious worship appropriated for
purposes other than religious worship or instruction.’”172 Exploiting that language, Massachusetts
taxing authorities deemed it appropriate to divide the properties of religious institutions to
determine which portions could be taxed. 173 And thus, Shrine’s extensive property consisted of
portions that were taxable and portions that were tax exempt. 174 The court ultimately determined
that the dominant purposes of the welcome center and maintenance building were to facilitate
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religious worship, whereas the dominant purposes of the safe house and the wildlife sanctuary
were not.175
The court’s analysis in Shrine of Our Lady of La Salette Inc., is indicative of the inherent
flaws within the dominant purpose test. The test is flawed because it requires courts to determine
how much of a religious institution’s property must be used and what. For instance, the wildlife
sanctuary, according to Shrine was used for meditative walks and was deemed connected to the
religious worship of the Shrine. 176 The court however, dismissed that argument because the
wildlife sanctuary was transferred to the Massachusetts Audubon Society to manage and perform
a range of conservation-related activities.177 The court pivots its argument on the legislative intent
and asserts that the legislator did not intend to include a wildlife sanctuary or even a safe house to
qualify as a house of religious worship.178 Although the court’s understanding of the legislators
intent may be accurate, legislators are bound by the Constitution and creating policy that leads the
government to control churches, is unconstitutional. If the dominant purpose test requires a court
to look at a property and determine which portions of that property are engaging in what kind of
activity, the court is interfering with religious beliefs because it places the identification of the use
of the property in the hands of a court. Despite having a truly religious purpose for a parcel, a
court may reject its reasoning and deem it insufficient for a tax exemption. This action by a court
belittles the religious groups intended purpose for the property and their identification of what
purpose that property serves for the advancement of their religious beliefs. A court acting in this
manner poses entanglement concerns endangering the religious freedom that religious
organizations enjoy to practice their beliefs.
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IV.

POTENTIAL SOLUTION
It is apparent that some kind of interaction will occur between state and religion. In

light of this reality, it would be logical to create a viable standard in which states may
potentially collect taxes from religious institutions that are maximizing profits from their
commercial entities. The standard should go as follows, if a religious institution uses a portion
of its property to derive profits from a commercial entity that surpass all operational cost, that
profit should be taxed. This form of taxation may potentially go beyond the confines of a
typical property tax, however, it would provide a feasible manner in which state and local
governments can attempt to avoid entanglement concerns while collecting taxes from churches
who may commercialize outside of the ordinary confines of religion.
For example, if CCP’s annual operational fee, including all good faith expenses
necessary to exist were $200,000, and the commercial properties were returning profits of
$400,000, the state or local government should be able to tax the difference between the
returning profit and the good faith expenses necessary to exist. Here, that would result in
$400,000 - $200,000 = $200,000 of taxable income.
However, even this suggestion may create entanglement concerns from the assessment
of financial statements that churches provide. Nevertheless, the standard is minimally intrusive
because religious institutions would provide their prepared expenses. Furthermore, a simple
formula is being utilized without the biases of human involvement. Potentially, a standard
like this would secure tax exemptions for religious institutions and may prevent commercial
organizations from abusing religious tax exemptions.
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V.

Conclusion
Ultimately, analyzing and normalizing surveillance over religion institutions in any

capacity is unconstitutional. As established in Lemon;
Under our system the choice has been made that government is to be entirely
excluded from the area of religious instruction and churches excluded from the
affairs of government. The Constitution decrees that religion must be a private
matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and that
while some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn. 179
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